

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

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SITUATION REPORT: POLAND

Two and one-half days after attempting a military solution to Poland's crisis, the regime of General Jaruzelski remains short of its admitted goals of "isolating" Solidarity militants and restoring order in Poland's factories. Instead, a war of attrition has developed between the security forces and those Solidarity factory committees that have been able to reconstitute themselves, with the security forces moving in and out of the factories and occasionally arresting union leaders. Violence has apparently occurred and is likely to spread, now that the threshold has been passed.

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Solidarity leaders, for their part, clearly overplayed their hand, both in terms of their tenacity in the negotiations they had been conducting with the regime over how to share power and in their overconfidence that the regime would not move against them. Solidarity leaders must be further disappointed that the Polish labor force did not spontaneously go out in a general strike after their arrest, as they had anticipated. They probably still believe, however, that no one can run Poland without their cooperation.

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Having committed himself to a high-risk course in imposing martial law, Jaruzelski is unlikely to allow the situation to remain stalemated for long. He essentially has two options available:

- Attempt to reopen negotiations with Solidarity leader Walesa. Jaruzelski could hope, that having delivered Solidarity a major body blow, its more moderate leaders may now be willing and able to make concessions. He may further hope that the rank and file will be more pliable, having seen what militancy can precipitate.
- Apply brute force massively to emasculate Solidarity completely, interning large numbers of Solidarity members, closing down those factories that have been militant strongholds, and using weapons.

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Reopening negotiations with Walesa does not seem a promising possibility, both because the regime seems currently disinterested in a political solution and because union leaders probably would be unwilling to make a deal while Solidarity members are still being arrested. [ ]

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The more likely prospect, therefore, is for an escalation in the use of force with ever greater participation by the army along with the police. Such a course risks both that the army will not prove reliable and that the greater use of force will be no more successful than the current level of application in breaking the Polish workers' movement, restoring order, and getting factories back in operation. Such an action, indeed, might only push Poland faster down the path to chaos. [ ]

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The Soviets, for their part, in public and private statements yesterday, indicated increasing concern over the course events are taking. TASS charged Washington with seeking to maintain an "atmosphere of anarchy" and with using Western broadcasts to "instigate" resistance. In what apparently was intended as a warning to the Polish population, a Soviet official told a Western correspondent that Moscow would provide military assistance if Jaruzelski requested it. [ ]

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Moscow would prefer to avoid international polemics and to downplay references to resistance and possible Soviet intervention. The Soviets' decision to weigh in with strong rhetoric suggests at least some diminution in their confidence that Jaruzelski will be able to manage the situation alone. [ ]

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